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National Transportation Safety Board 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was created by 
the Departmen.t of Transportation Act of 1966, which simultaneously es- 
tablished the Department of Transportation. 
dependent Safety Board Act of 1974 which established the Safety Board 
as an entirely independent Federal agency and broadened the responsi- 
bilities of the Board in the investigation and prevention of trans- 
portation accidents. Among other things, the Board is charged with: 
However, it was the In- 
Investigating certain aviation, highway, railroad, pipeline, 
and marine accidents. 
Reporting publicly on the facts, conditions and circumstances 
and the cause(s) or probable cause(s) of such accidents. 
Issuing periodic reports to the Congress and to federal, state, 
and local transportation safety agencies and others recommend- 
ing measures to reduce the 1 i kel i hood of transportation 
accidents. 
0 Initiating and conducting special transportation safety studies 
and investigations. 
Inasmuch as this workshop deals with aviation systems and the 
meteorological and environmental inputs to such systems, this overview 
will deal only with aviation accident investigation and particularly 
with those cases in which there was a weather involvement. A weather- 
involved accident will be defined as one in which the Board has deter- 
mined that weather was a cause or a contributing factor. 
Before discussing some specifics of weather-involved accidents 
it might be appropriate to provide a brief summary of the manner in 
which the Board conducts its investigations, for the benefit of those 
attendees fortunate enough not to have been active participants in such 
investigations. The Board's headquarters are located at 800 Indepen- 
dence Avenue Southwest in Washington, DC,--the same building that 
houses the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) headquarters. There 
are 12 field offices spread out from Miami, Florida, to Anchorage, 
Alaska. Eleven of those 12 are designated as Aviation Field Offices. 
Eight of the 12 are also Railroad Offices, four are also Highway 
Offices and three are also Pipeline Offices, since the Board's work is 
intermodal. Under normal circumstances, the field offices conduct in- 
vestigations of general aviation type accidents. The investigation 
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is usually conducted by one investigator from a field office assisted 
generally byan FAA man and on occasion by a manufacturer's represen- 
tative, i.e., the manufacturer of the aircraft, powerplant or on-board 
systems. The field offices are provided with any required technical 
backup from appropriate professional experts in Washington. For exam- 
ple, the case may require the services o f  our metallurgical laboratory, 
or investigative assistance from an air traffic control specialist, 
a meteorologist or others. Field office personnel are also called upon 
to "staRe down" the scene of an air carrier accident until an investi- 
gative team arrives from Washington, assist in the investigation and 
also provide logistical support. 
Air carrier accident investigations, on the other hand, are con- 
ducted differently. In Washington, there is always a so-called "Go- 
Team" on standby. The Go-Team is made up of about 10 investigators. 
There is an Investigator-in-Charge and experts in the various technical 
areas such as operations, air traffic control , weather, powerplants, 
etc. The team is normally accompanied to the accident scene by a Board 
Member and a representative from our Office of Public Affairs. 
order to develop a complete factual record, the Board will, at an or- 
ganization meeting, designate Parties to the Investigation to assist 
the Board in its work. the 
FAA, National Weather Service (NWS) , local governmental organizations 
and others. Also included as Parties will be such organizations as: 
the air carrier involved, airframe, powerplant and systems manufacturers , 
the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) , Professional Air Traffic Con- 
trollers Organization (PATCO) , and various other trade unions and or- 
ganizations as may be appropriate. 
In 
The Parties consist of such agencies as: 
Under the overall direction of the NTSB Investigator-in-Charge 
the investigation is conducted by the various groups in their own areas 
of expertise under the chairmanship o f  an NTSB investigator. Informa- 
tion is exchanged between participants and coordination is effected at 
periodic Progress Meetings convened by the fnvestigator-in-Charge. 
Under the direction of each NTSB Group Chairman, one set of group notes 
is maintained from which there eventually will be drafted a Group 
Chairman's Factual Report. 
Should circumstances dictate that after the field phase of the 
investigation is complete a public hearing be held, all Parties are 
notified and Parties to the Hearing will be designated, normally from 
among those agencies and organizations which have already participated 
in the field phase. At the Public Hearing, testimony is taken under 
oath from appropriate witnesses with questions first from the Board's 
Technical Panel, normally made up of NTSB Group Chairmen. Questions 
are also allowed from spokesmen from each of the designated Parties 
as well as from members of the NTSB Board of Inquiry which conducts 
the hearing. Subsequently, a formal Board report will be prepared for 
public release and will contain pertinent findings and the cause or 
probable cause. At any time after the accident, the Board could issue 
Safety Recommendations pertinent to the case involved, directed to 
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appropriate agencies and organizations w i t h  an indication of the 
pr ior i ty  s ta tus  of each recommendation. Also, as  you know, the Board 
does periodically p u b l i s h  reports on special studies i t  has developed 
on various subjects. We are  aware tha t  previous workshops discussed 
a t  some length the resu l t s  o f  the Board's Special Study on Fatal 
Weather-Involved General Aviation Accidents. 
Most of  the remainder of this overview paper will be divided into 
two categories, i .e . ,  information concerning a i r  ca r r i e r  accidents and 
information relat ing t o  general aviation accidents. 
General Aviation Accidents 
Table 1 has been developed to  provide an overview of a l l  general 
aviation accidents over a recent 5-year period as well as a comparison 
between a l l  accidents and the weather-involved accidents. The NTSB 
continues to  be concerned not only w i t h  the overall accident picture, 
b u t  w i t h  the continuing large number of weather involvements. Weather 
continues to  be one of the most, i f  not the most frequently c i ted  
causal factor  i n  f a t a l ,  general aviation accidents. Table 1 shows 
tha t  16.5% of a l l  accidents a re  f a t a l ,  tha t  22.4% of a l l  accidents a re  
weather-involved, and tha t  38.6% of the f a t a l  accidents a re  weather- 
involved accidents. Looking a t  just the weather-involved accidents, 
more than 28% of those a re  f a t a l  , and, on the average, two or more 
people are  ki l led in each one. 
Table 1 
U.S. GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 
Total 
1973 4,255 
1974 4,425 
1975 4,237 
1976 4,193 
1977 4,286 
Total 21,396 
All Accidents 
Total Fatal Fa ta l i t i e s  
723 1,412 
729 1,438 
675 1,345 
695 1,320 
702 1,436 
3,524 6,951 
Weather-Involved Accidents 
Total 
963 
1,009 
985 
89 7 
946 
4 , 800 
Total Fatal Fa ta l i t i e s  
273 61 8 
300 702 
278 644 
255 606 
254 61 5 
1,360 3,185 
Those of you who a re  familiar w i t h  o r  who have copies of the 
Board's 1974 Special Study of Fatal ,  Weather-Involved General Aviation 
Accidents ( w h i c h  covered a 9-year period) will recognize tha t  the per- 
centages just quoted a re  not s ignif icant ly d i f fe rent  from those g i v e n  
i n  1974. 
i 
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It is not the intent of this paper to update completely the afore- 
mentioned Special Study, but it was considered of interest to provide 
another look at some of the statistical data available. 
For example, what kinds of pilot ratings were held by those in- 
volved in the weather accidents delineated in Table l? The Board lists 
more than 20 kinds of pilot ratings and also the category of "NO Rating." 
Human nature being what it is, we have found that almost 1.5% of the 
pilots in weather-involved accidents had no ratings of any kind. On 
the other hand 55.7% of them had airplane-single-engine-land ratings, 
19% had airplane-single/mul ti-engine-land ratings and about 30% had an 
instrument rating of some kind. The figures also show that 36% of the 
pilots with instrument ratings were involved in fatal accidents. One 
must conclude, therefore, that while an instrument rating is nice to 
have, it is no guarantee for protection against being involved in a 
weather accident. 
The NTSB categorizes about 65 phases of operation. In an attempt 
to separate the phases of operations during which most accidents occurred, 
it was found that the percentages in weather-involved accidents were 
much the same as the overall general aviation accident picture and that 
the highest percentage of accidents (35.4%) occurred during the landing 
phase. This is divided as follows: Level-off/touchdown 15.2%, Roll 
(fixed-wing) 13.3%, and Final approach 6.9%. 
with 12.1% and Inflight was next with 11.6%. In all the remaining 
approximately 60 categories, the percentages were less than 3% in each. 
Takeoff was next in line 
Table 2 was developed to provide some information about the fil- 
Obviously, 
ing of flight plans. 
the table merely highlights the most prevalent citations. 
most pilots do not file flight plans and about three times as many pi- 
lots who do not file flight plans are involved in weather accidents 
as compared with those who do file. 
There are many more categories than shown, but 
Table 2 
U.S. GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 
1973-1 977 
None 
VRF 
I FR 
FLIGHT PLANS 
All Accidents Weather-Involved Accidents 
82.7% 73.8% 
10.6% 13.8% 
5.2% 10.5% 
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The matter of weather briefing is always of interest, particularly 
those provided prior to an accident which falls in the weather-involved 
category. 
briefings and as would be expected, briefings by Flight Service Station 
(FSS) personnel head the list with more than 33% of the briefings hav- 
ing been provided to pilots in all accidents and almost 40% provided 
to those who had weather type accidents. As you can see, NWS personnel 
provided less than 3% of the briefings in both cases. 
noted that in relation to both, all accidents as well as the weather- 
involved cases, there are large percentages in which there is no record 
of a briefing having been provided. 
the pilots received no briefing (in accordance with the Federal Aviation 
Regulations for many flights), but that the air safety investigator 
could not locate such a record, even if there was one. We are well 
aware that there are many ways to receive a weather briefing and that 
Table 3 was developed to show the major sources of weather 
It should be 
There is not the implication that 
no record may 
FSS 
by phone 
FSS 
in person 
FS S 
by radio 
Total 
NWS 
by phone 
NWS 
in person 
Total 
No record of 
briefing 
Unknown/not 
reported 
exist. 
Table 3 
U.S. GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 
1973-1977 
WEATHER BRIEFING 
A1 I Accidents 
21 -9% 
5.2% 
6.4% 
33.5% 
Weather-Involved Accidents 
25.8% 
5.7% 
7.5% 
39.0% 
1.6% .7& 
1 . l% 
2.7% 
.2% 
2.9% 
41.2% 35.4% 
14.0% 13.4% 
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In connection w i t h  the weather-involved accidents, more than 51% 
of the p i lo t s  d i d  get a weather briefing of some k ind  (when we had evi- 
dence of a briefing).  
brief i ng. 
tunately, i n  the cases covering the 5-year period being discussed, 
more often than not, i t  was not possible t o  make such an assessment. 
I t  can only be said a t  t h i s  time tha t  in about 45% of the cases, the 
forecasts were considered t o  have been substant ial ly  correct  o r  the 
weather was s l igh t ly  be t te r  than forecast. I t  can also be said tha t  
i n  only about 5% of the cases, the weather was worse than forecast. 
However, one must note tha t  i n  more than 50% of the cases our data bank 
shows only tha t  forecast information was "Unknown/Not Reported." 
Overall , 45% of the p i lo t s  received a weather 
The accuracy of weather forecasts is always a concern, b u t  unfor- 
We are  frequently asked t o  provide information concerning the types 
o f  weather phenomena most often associated w i t h  accidents. I t  appears 
tha t  over the years the l i s t  is  almost invariably the same i n  fa ta l  acci- 
dents (Table 4-a) and i n  the non-fatal accidents (Table 4-b). As i s  
quite evident i n  Table 4, low ce i l ing ,  fog and rain top t h p  l i s t  as  they 
d i d  i n  our 1974 study of the fa ta l  accidents; andunfavorable wind  condi- 
t ions,  updraft/downdraft and low cei l ing are among the top three just 
a s  they were i n  our 1976 study of the non-fatal accidents. The Board 
uses more than 20 categories of which Table 4 i s  just an abstract .  
should be noted tha t  a category which has been added is wind shear,  
which  has been ci ted more than 30 times as a cause or fac tor  over the 
5-year period covered by this paper. 
I t  
Table 4-a 
U.S. GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 
1973-1977 
CAUSE/FACTOR TABLE : WEATHER PHENOMENA 
Fatal Accidents 
Low cei l ing 
Fog 
Rain 
Snow 
Thunderstorm ac t iv i ty  
Icing conditions 
Cause Factor 
7 795 
6 544 
- 298 
1 151 
6 133 
8 107 
Total 
802 
550 
298 
152 
139 
115 
J 
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Table 4-b 
Non-Fatal Accidents 
Cause 
306 Unfavorable wind 
conditions 
Factor 
1,258 
Total 
1,564 
Up/down d ra f t  86 249 335 
Low cei l ing 5 308 31 3 
Fog 
Condi t i  ons conducive 
t o  carburetor icing 
5 290 295 
30 2 82 292 
Rain - 160 160 
I t  i s  common knowledge tha t  most general aviation flying is i n  the 
I t  would be anticipated, therefore, t ha t  flying-for-pleasure category. 
most o f  the accidents would occur d u r i n g  pleasure f lying,  and tha t  is  
quite correct.  The Board l i s t s  more than 50 categories of f lying,  and 
Table 5 l i s t s  some of the t o p  categories where accidents a re  involved. 
Table 5 
U.S. GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 
1973- 1977 
KIND OF FLYING 
A1 1 G/A Accidents Weather-Involved Accidents 
P1 easure 50.6% 58.8% 
Business 7.2% 9.5% 
Aerial appl ication 5.8% - 
Instructional/dual 5.3% - 
Instructional /solo 4.3% - 
Air taxi -passenger - 
operations 
4.2% 
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As you are  well aware, the p i lo t  involvement as a cause or  fac tor  
i n  weather type accidents is quite high. 
highlight the major types of p i lo t  involvement (of the more t h a n  60 
l i s ted  by the Board) w h i c h  occurred i n  weather-involved accidents dur- 
i n g  the 1973-1977 period. 
outlined i n  the 1974 study previously mentioned. 
Table 6 has been developed t o  
Four of these top five are  the same c i ta t ions  
Table 6 
U.S. GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS -
CAUSE/FACTOR TABLE: PILOT INVOLVEMENT 
Fatal Accidents 
Pilot-in-command 
Continued f l i g h t  i n  adverse weather 
Spat i a1 d i  sor i  en t a t  i on 
Inadequate pref l ight  preparation o r  
planning 
Improper in f l igh t  decision o r  
planning 
Failed t o  obtain/maintain flying 
speed 
I 
Cause Factor 
641 12  
458 1 
145 157 
243 51 
195 - 
Total 
653 
459 
302 
294 
195 
Air Carrier Accidents 
Table 7 i s  a tab le  fo r  a i r  ca r r i e r  accidents parallel  t o  Table 1 
for the general aviation segment of the industry. 
are  n o t  nearly so large,  except fo r  the f a t a l i t i e s  resul t ing from the 
Tenerife ground col l is ion i n  1977, the percentage of weather-involved 
accidents i s  disturbing. I t  i s  perfectly obvious tha t  of the f a t a l  
accidents 50% were weather-involved and tha t  compared t o  the to ta l  a i r  
ca r r i e r  accidents , almost 50% were weather-involved. Looking a t  a l l  
accidents, 15.9% were fa ta l  accidents, which i s  about the same as i n  
general aviation. Ignoring the Tenerife accident as an unusual and 
hopefully a non-recurring event, there were, on the average, 41 persons 
ki l led i n  each a i r  ca r r i e r  accident. 
While the numbers 
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Table 7 
U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS 
1973-1 977 
A1 1 Accidents Weather-Invol ved Accidents 
Total Total Fatal Fa ta l i t i e s  Total Total Fatal Fatali ties 
1973 43 9 227 22 4 143 
1974 47 9 46 7 25 4 195 
1975 45 3 124 21 2 122 
1976 28 4 45 12 3 45 
1977 - 26 5 655 13 - 2 644 
Total 189 30 1,518 93 15 1,149 
--
In discussing a i r  ca r r i e r  accidents, i t  was decided n o t  t o  deal 
w i t h  such matters as p i lo t  ra t ings,  f l i g h t  plans, weather briefings,  
and weather forecasts. I t  was also unnecessary t o  discuss kinds of 
flying. 
Table 8 l i s t s  the weather phenomena, b o t h  fa ta l  (Table 8-a) and 
non-fatal (Table 8- b ) ,  most frequently ci ted by the Board in a i r  ca r r i e r  
accidents from 1973-1977: 
Table 8-a 
U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS 
1973-1977 
CAUSE/FACTOR TABLE : WEATHER PHENOMENA 
Fatal Accidents 
Cause Factor 
Thunderstorm ac t iv i ty  3 2 
Low cei l ing - 4 
Rain - 4 
Total 
5 
4 
4 
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Table 8-b 
Non-Fatal Accidents 
Cause Factor Total 
Turbulence associated w i t h  32 
clouds and/or thunderstorms 
1 33 
Clear a i r  turbulence 21 1 22 
Thunderstorm ac t iv i ty  2 6 8 
As i n  the general aviation area,  i t  was considered of interest 
t o  review the p i lo t  involvement as a cause or  factor .  
rier accidents, the c i ta t ions  were well scattered over more than 35 
different  types. Table 9 deals with the t o p  c i ta t ions  involved i n  
both  fa ta l  (Table 9-a) and non-fatal (Table 9-b) accidents. 
In the a i r  car- 
Table 9-a 
U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS 
1973-1 977 
CAUSE/FACTOR TABLE: PILOT INVOLVEMENT 
Fatal Accidents 
Cause Factor 
Failed t o  follow approved 6 
procedures, direct ives ,  e tc .  
Improper inf l igh t  decisions 3 
or planning 
1 
4 
Improper IFR operation 4 - 
Total 
7 
7 
4 
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Table 9-b 
Non-Fatal Accidents 
Cause Factor Total 
Failed t o  follow approved 11 
procedures, directives,  e tc .  
1 1 2  
Failed t o  i n i t i a t e  go-around 6 - 6 
Improper i n f  1 i g h t deci s i  on 4 
or planning 
1 5 
Failed t o  maintain 
directional control 
5 - 5 
As this paper was being completed, some additional information 
became available which was considered t o  be of in te res t  t o  this meet- 
ing. The information concerns a 10-year look a t  some of the a i r  car- 
r i e r  data. 
weather was the most frequently c i ted  factor i n  the United States cer- 
t i f i ca ted  route a i r  ca r r ie r  accidents--48.3% i n  a l l  accidents and 45.3% 
i n  f a ta l  accidents. Turbulence was c i ted  as the most frequent causal 
c i ta t ion when l i s t i ng  types of accidents--32% of the to ta l .  Experience 
has shown tha t  there are fewer CAT c i ta t ions  t h a n  c i ta t ions  of t u r b u-  
lence associated w i t h  thunderstorms. 
versus CAT i s  generally somewhat less  than two t o  one. 
For example, fo r  the 10-year period 1968 through 1977, 
The r a t i o  of convective type 
General 
As most of the attendees know, the Safety Board i s  n o t  a regulatory 
agency. One of the most important end products is  the safety recornmen- 
dation addressed t o  other agencies and organizations. 
recommendations are designed to  reduce the likelihood of transportation 
accidents. They do not have the force of law, however, they are made 
public by many means including publication i n  the Federal Register. 
Despite the fac t  t ha t  the recommendations are n o t  mandatory, you may be 
certain that  they carry considerable weight w i t h  the recipients. 
are aware tha t  they are  also of considerable in te res t  to  the Congress. 
As s ta ted previously, each recommendation 
t i o n  o f  the p r io r i ty  i t  should be given. 
Of course the 
We 
carr ies  w i t h  i t  an indica- 
Since the Board became operational i n  1967, i t  has issued 82 recom- 
mendations related t o  weather, most of which have gone t o  the FAA and/or 
NOAA/NWS. A review of the status of those recommendations indicates 
that  only 10 of them have been closed w i t h  the notation of "unacceptable 
action." As a "batting average," t h a t ' s  n o t  bad, b u t  the batting average, 
or  acceptance ra te ,  is  not as important as the improvements made t o  fac- 
i l i t i e s ,  services and procedures leading t o  an increase i n  aviation 
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safety. Obviously, the Board cannot take fu l l  c red i t  fo r  a l l  of the 
changes, b u t  certainly the impetus of many of them has come from the 
Board and can be a t t es ted  t o  be representatives from the FAA and NOAA/NWS. 
The s t a t i s t i c s  provided make i t  obvious tha t  there continues t o  be 
a requirement fo r  a decending trend i n  weather-involved accidents i n  U.S. 
aviation. What are  the major problems standing i n  the way of such a 
downward trend? Based only on the s t a t i s t i c s  i n  this overview, i t  
would appear tha t  p i l o t  t raining,  par t icular ly  i n  the general aviation 
area, is  one of them. Why do so many p i lo t s  continue f l i gh t  i n  adverse 
weather? I t  could be, as the Board has said many times before, t ha t  i t  
may well be because of the p i lo t s '  mistaken idea of t he i r  ab i l i t y  t o  
cope w i t h  certain weather si tuations.  Is i t  because of the lack of con- 
tinued training a f t e r  a p i l o t  obtains his i n i t i a l  ce r t i f i ca te?  Is i t  
the overall quali ty of the training? Why is he c i ted  so often for  i n -  
adequate prefl ight  preparation or  planning? Is t h a t  because of the 
problems associated w i t h  obtaining pref l ight  information? Why are there 
so  many cases i n  which no record o f  a weather briefing? Why does weather 
continue t o  be so  dominant a fac tor  i n  a i r  ca r r ie r  accidents? Why, 
despite airborne weather radar, do there continue t o  be so many acci- 
dents involvi'ng thunderstorms? Why so many CAT accidents? 
These and many other questions will be discussed over the next 
three-day period i n  accordance w i t h  the overall objectives of the work- 
shop. 
problems raised and that  the workshop wil l  be successful i n  recommend- 
ing pr ior i t iza t ion and implementation o f  these solutions. 
1 trust t h a t  there will be agreement on some solutions t o  the 
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